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GOD, ANIMALS AND ZOMBIES
Joseph J. Lynch
California Polytechnic State University
Resumen
Argumentos neo-cartesianos recientes intentan reducir los animales a zombis filosóficos, 
seres sin estados de conciencia fenoménica. Si tales argumentos fuesen correctos, los 
animales verdaderamente no sufrirían, y, por tanto, no existiría el problema de Dios y el 
sufrimiento animal. En mi opinión, la afirmación de que los animales son zombis no es 
suficientemente plausible para proporcionar una teodicea adecuada acerca del problema 
de Dios y el dolor animal.
Palabras clave: Dios, animales, conciencia, teodicea, problema del mal, derechos animales, 
dolor animal, sufrimiento animal, zombis.
Abstract
Recent Neo-Cartesian arguments attempt to reduce animals to philosophical zombies, 
beings without phenomenally conscious states. If these arguments are right, animals do 
not genuinely suffer, and so there can be no problem of God and animal suffering. I try 
that the claim that animals are zombies is insufficiently plausible to provide an adequate 
theodicy with respect to the problem of God and animal pain.
Keywords: God, animals, consciousness, theodicy, problem of evil, animal rights, animal 
pain, animal suffering, zombies.
Several years ago I wrote a couple of articles about God and animal 
pain.1 I was struck by the fact it was the problem of animal suffering 
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that helped erode the faith of Charles Darwin. Why would a good and 
powerful God permit so much suffering for so long? It is of course a 
particularly challenging form of the standard problem of evil. On the 
Classical Theist picture, God is omnipotent, and thus is able to eliminate 
suffering, God is perfectly good and thus would want to eliminate suffering. 
But suffering exists. This challenge to Classical Theism has many familiar 
responses, and most of the more compelling ones involve, in some way, 
an appeal to human free will. Typically, the theist wants to maintain that 
while it’s difficult for us to see, all the evils of suffering are necessary in 
order for God to bring about a greater good. But there are instances of 
intense suffering that seem, on the face of it anyway, to be gratuitous or 
pointless. A pointless evil is an evil that an omnipotent God could have 
eliminated without thereby losing a greater good or having to permit an 
evil equally bad or worse. William Rowe gave the compelling example 
of the suffering fawn:
Here we develop the argument by focusing on animal suffering: a fawn’s being 
badly burned in a fire cause by lightning, and suffering terribly before death ends 
its life. Unlike humans, fawns are not credited with free will, and so the fawn’s 
suffering cannot be attributed to misuse of free will. Why then would God permit 
it to happen when, if he exists, he could have so easily prevented it? It is generally 
admitted that we are simply unable to imagine any greater good whose realization 
can reasonably be thought to require God to permit that fawn’s terrible suffering. 
And it hardly seems reasonable to suppose there is some greater evil God would 
have been unable to prevent had he not permitted that fawn’s five days of suffering.2
The problem of animal suffering seems to be intractable. Millions of 
creatures have suffered throughout what Darwin called “almost endless 
time.” The Christian writer C.S. Lewis observed that animals can “neither 
deserve pain, nor be improved by it.”3 The power of Rowe’s suffering fawn 
example is precisely that in that particular case, no good seems to come 
from this instance of pain and suffering. Of course animal pain generally 
might lead to some greater good. But it’s worth noting even there that 
what is required to show that logically the greater good could not have 
been achieved without the relevant suffering. This is a difficult challenge 
for those who believe in an omnipotent God. Without omnipotence, you 
have, of course, a very different story. For human beings, many greater 
goods cannot be realized without bearing some evils. For example during 
2 Rowe, William, Philosophy of Religion Belmont: Wadsworth, 2007, p. 120.
3 Lewis, C. S., The Problem of Pain, New York: MacMillan, 1962, p. 129.
Joseph J. Lynch God, animals and zombies
15 ÁGORA (2011), Vol. 30, nº 2: 13-25
the Civil War, many soldiers had to have limbs amputated in order to 
save their lives. The greater good of a continued life could not be realized 
otherwise. But an omnipotent God, surely, could save the life, without 
sacrificing the limb. So, the case of animal suffering is particularly tough, 
because while perhaps not all animal suffering seems pointless, it’s not clear 
that the goods that result from it could not have been realized without 
the suffering, and there so many cases, like Rowe’s suffering fawn, where 
the suffering appears to be gratuitous or pointless.
In my earlier articles I focused on a few attempts to solve the problem 
of animal pain, such as those by John Hick,4 Peter Geach,5 and a few 
others to show that their attempts fail to reconcile God’s unlimited 
power and goodness with animal pain. The number of theists writing on 
theodicy and animal pain was and is a pretty short list. While it must be 
acknowledged that these thinkers at least recognized that the problem of 
animal pain is indeed a problem, I wanted to show that none of these 
theodicies could really take animal pain seriously. In fact, the very attempt 
to explain animal suffering away from a Classical Theist point of view 
amounted to minimizing the importance of the experience of the animals 
themselves. But, there is a line of thought within philosophical theology 
that minimizes the suffering of animals much more than these approaches. 
This line of reasoning has a lineage that traces back to René Descartes.
1. Revenge of the Cartesians
Well, in doing this work I only mentioned in passing the notorious view 
of Descartes and its impact on Neo-Cartesianism. Descartes argued that 
because animals were allegedly incapable of talk, they were incapable of 
thought. And he is usually taken to be denying consciousness to animals 
on this basis. His Port Royal followers certainly did, as seen in this widely 
quoted eyewitness account:
They administered beatings to dogs with perfect indifference, and made fun of 
those who pitied the creatures as if they felt pain. They said the animals were 
clocks; that the cries they emitted when struck were only the noise of a little spring 
that had been touched, but that the whole body was without feeling. They nailed 
4 Hick, John, Evil and the God of Love, New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
5 Geach, Peter, Providence and Evil, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
Joseph J. Lynch God, animals and zombies
16 ÁGORA (2011), Vol. 30, nº 2: 13-25
the poor animals up on boards by their four paws to vivisect them and see the 
circulation of the blood which was a great subject of conversation.6
 In any case, if Descartes were right, there is no real problem of animal 
suffering, because animals are not conscious beings. Animals are mere 
machines. That has struck nearly everyone as not only deeply counter-
intuitive but also counter to our experience with animals. And for the 
most it went away. Several years ago Neo-Cartesianism reared its head 
again in the context of theodicy in the work of Peter Harrison. 
The principle strategy in Harrison’s work was to deny that animals (or 
infants) have sufficient continuity of consciousness for their experiences to 
count as genuinely conscious, and then to counter the standard arguments 
in favor of animal consciousness, physiological similarity between humans 
and other animals, and our shared evolutionary history. In other words, 
Harrison and other Neo-Cartesians, maintain that animal behavior can 
be accounted for entirely without animal consciousness. Since there is 
no logical inference from animal behaviors to animal consciousness, we 
are not compelled to attribute consciousness to animals. Animals may be 
more than machines, but without consciousness, it’s hard to see that they 
are really much more. And without consciousness, it’s not clear that they 
have any moral standing at all. If they don’t really feel pain, they can’t 
suffer. And if they can’t suffer, there can be no pointless evil of animal 
suffering. The problem of God and animal pain simply disappears.
2. Animal Zombies
While for nearly everyone the claim that nonhuman animals lack 
any real consciousness at all seems so widely counter-intuitive, that we 
don’t generally take such views seriously at all. I wrote a little bit about 
Harrison’s argument a few years ago, and I must admit that I didn’t 
take his neo-Cartesianism seriously either. My counter amounted to little 
more than an appeal to our deeply held intuitions that animals must 
be conscious. And indeed it is this fact that provides the basis for their 
moral standing. This is still my intuition now, but some recent discussion 
in contemporary philosophy of mind seems to provide ammunition for 
the Neo-Cartesian position.
6 Quoted in Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, New York: Avon Books, 1975.
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One famous thought experiment is this. Imagine a world just like this 
one where all the same physical laws obtain, including those that give 
rise to the process of natural selection. But in this world, there are no 
conscious beings. Our human counterparts seem to be conscious but in 
reality they are not. They are in fact zombies. Not the sort of brain eating 
zombies, we see in movies, but beings just like us, except there is nothing 
that it is like to be one of those beings. They have no conscious states at 
all. Sure, if they stub a toe, they say “ouch” and may comment on the 
tastiness of vegan cuisine. They might even attend conferences and give 
papers on consciousness. But they experience nothing. Is Zombie world 
a possible world? It seems to many that it is. Of course our world is 
not Zombie world. But animals themselves may well in fact be zombies!
To say that animals could be zombies is not to say that they lack 
a mental life altogether. There are many types of mental states and 
processes one could rightly attribute to animals, but these are not properly 
conscious mental states. More precisely, if Ned Block is right, there is 
even a form of consciousness that animal zombies can have.7 Block has 
usefully defended the distinction between Access Consciousness and 
Phenomenal Consciousness. Access consciousness simply means that the 
mental representations are available for an individual to use in rational 
action or speech. Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective feel, having 
to with qualitative experiences. When Thomas Nagel wrote, “What it’s 
Like to Be a Bat?” he assumed that there is something that it’s like to be 
a bat.8 That is to say, bats and other animals are sentient beings. They 
presumably have Phenomenal Consciousness as well. So, Neo-Cartesians 
can maintain that while many animals may have Access Consciousness, 
they do not necessarily have Phenomenal Consciousness. And it’s only 
Phenomenal Consciousness that counts from a moral point of view and 
with respect to the problem of God and animal pain. The Neo-Cartesian 
can appeal to all sorts of mental states and even conscious mental states 
(so long as they are not phenomenally conscious states) in explaining 
animal behavior. Animals would not have the sort of conscious mentality 
that matters morally or that makes the problem of animal pain a genuine 
problem.
7 Block, Ned J., “On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness,” in Block, 
Ned J.; Flanagan, Owen J. and Güzeldere, Güven (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 375-415.
8 Nagel’s essay is widely published, e.g. Nagel, Thomas, “What it’s Like to Be a Bat?”, 
in Block; Flanagan, and Güzeldere (eds.) op. cit., 519-527.
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One proponent of what I am calling the Animals As Zombies view 
is Michael Murray. Murray takes on the problem of animal suffering 
in a direct and comprehensive way, so it’s worth describing his general 
strategy before addressing his defense of Neo-Cartesianism. The critic of 
theism argues that [1] If God exists there would be no gratuitous evil 
(e.g., animal suffering), [2] There is gratuitous suffering, [3] Therefore 
God does not exist. Murray acknowledges that a mere defense of Theism 
is insufficient. A defense would only show that the critic has failed to 
establish that Theism is unlikely due to the fact of animal suffering. That 
is the Theist could endorse [1] and deny [3] from which it follows that [2] 
is false. While such a defense may be successful, it provides no positive 
reasons to reconcile animal suffering with the existence of God. I’ll come 
back to that position later on. On the other hand, according to Murray, 
a full theodicy, which would explain every instance of animal suffering, 
goes too far, because it seems unlikely that humans could possibly know 
every divine purpose. Murray argues for a kind of middle path, which he 
calls a Causa Dei (CD), a term he borrowed from Leibniz. A successful 
CD would show that we are not justified in believing animal suffering 
to be gratuitous and thus counting the suffering as evidence against 
God’s existence – in the light of our justified acceptances. That is, the 
successful CD would undermine [2]. Murray then systematically analyzes 
several CDs, contending that at least some are successful, including the 
Neo-Cartesian approach.
In the first chapter of the book Murray provides three moral conditions 
that must be met for God to permit evil. 
A. The Necessity Condition: the good secured by the permission of the evil, E, 
could not have been secured without permitting either E or some evils morally 
equivalent to or worse than E.
B. The Outweighing Condition: the good secured by the permission of the evil is 
sufficiently outweighing.
C. The Rights Condition: it is within the rights of the one permitting the evil to 
permit it.
What sort of CDs could do this? Murray rejects a suggestion by David 
Lewis that the theist needs an explanation that is somewhat plausible to 
Christians and other theists. This sets the standard too high; the theist 
only need to invoke hypotheses, that are true as far as he or she knows, 
that is the hypotheses are as plausible as not. Murray thinks that Van 
Inwagen’s standard is also too high. He claims that the theist needs “a 
story such that both God and the suffering contained in the actual world 
exist, and which it is such that…there is no reason to think it is false, a 
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story that is not surprising on the hypothesis that God exists.”9 Murray 
correctly observes that we regularly engage in reasoning which would 
fail to meet this standard; we do in fact have some reason to believe a 
claim is false, but we can still accept the claim in the light of the totality 
of other beliefs we have. Instead, he proposes that the theist needs to 
construct hypotheses that show that the evil in question meet conditions 
A through C, and that the theist “is not justified or warranted in rejecting 
in the light of what she justifiably accepts.”10
Ideally, the justifiable acceptances in the CDs would be held in common 
to theists and nontheists alike. Murray contends that many of the CDs 
contain explanations that “do not stand in tension with claims that 
would be accepted by those reasonably well-educated in contemporary 
philosophy and science.” Still, there may vast differences between what 
theists and nontheists justifiably accept, so the objectives of CDs can differ. 
The point of some is to show that the theist can defend the rationality of 
her belief in the face of evil; the point of others is to show that the non-
theist is not justified in rejecting theism on the basis of evil. Still others, 
Murray claims, will do both. The CDs that purportedly can undermine 
the evidential argument from evil by showing that the non-theist is not 
justified in rejecting theism on the basis of animal suffering are of particular 
interest. If it turns out that all a CD can do is offer epistemic comfort for 
the theist; i.e., theism is defensible only because the theist can maintain 
rationality given what she but not the non-theist accepts, it’s hard to see 
how the CD could be called a success at all. Indeed it would be hard 
to distinguish a CD from a mere defense. But again, Murray contends 
some of the CDs have enough force to demonstrate that atheism cannot 
be defended on the grounds of appealing to gratuitous evil.
The overall strategy that Murphy employs seems compelling, and to 
his credit he examines in rich detail many possible approaches to the 
problem of animal suffering and theism. However he contends that the 
Neo-Cartesian approach is in fact successful alone (indeed if it is, the 
other CD would clearly be superfluous). He rightly recognizes that most 
will not be convinced of this and therefore defends some other more 
plausible approaches as well. I am among those who are completely 
unconvinced by the Neo-Cartesian approach. In general the contention 
9 Murray, Michael J., Nature: Red In Tooth & Claw, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 38.
10 Ibid., p. 39.
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seems to be that given our acceptances, we are not justified in rejecting 
the claim that animals lack phenomenal consciousness. And without 
phenomenal consciousness, there can be no awareness of pain. Clearly 
without awareness of pain, there just is no problem of animal suffering. 
There is no reason given for the permission of animal suffering; instead, 
the Neo-Cartesian approach is simply to deny this is a genuine problem 
at all. It could be claimed that the neo-Cartesian approach would just 
give rise to a new problem – why does it seem to almost everyone that 
animals are conscious and can feel pain, if in fact they cannot? To his 
credit, Murray observes that there are evolutionary explanations for the 
disposition to believe in the consciousness of other beings whether they 
are in fact conscious or not. Anthropomorphisms have a survival value 
to be sure, but it does not explain why an omnipotent omnibenevolent 
God would instantiate a world that appears to contain gratuitous evil. 
The problem of apparent evil is still a problem. Still, if the Neo-Cartesian 
argument is successful, the initial problem of animal pain ceases to be a 
genuine problem.
  
3. Why Animals Are Allegedly Zombies But Human Animals Aren’t
The task of a Neo-Cartesian, like Descartes himself, is to show that 
it is plausible to say that animals are zombies, but not plausible to say 
this of human beings. After all, one only has direct access to one’s own 
conscious states. Perhaps I should conclude that everyone is a zombie 
but me. Descartes famously argued that only the use of language was 
sufficient to prove the presence of thought. While there are some defenders 
of a view that links thought to language alone, few follow Descartes in 
denying consciousness to animals on this basis.11 A Neo-Cartesian, like 
Murray, needs to clarify precisely what it is that makes humans and 
humans alone have subjective mental states.
Recall that the standard for success is fairly low. Neo-Cartesianism 
need only be shown to be as plausible as not, given what we know. The 
Cartesian picture can be supported by drawing the distinction between 
Access consciousness and Phenomenal consciousness, as we have seen. 
11 For example Davidson, Donald, “Thought and Talk”, in Guttenplan, Samuel (ed.), 
Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1975, 
7-23. Davidson makes clear he does not intend to deny conscious mental states to ani-
mals, however.
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A robot could access its various cognitive states; avoid noxious stimuli, 
etc. while having no phenomenally conscious states at all. There need be 
nothing that it is like to be that robot. What then would make a mental 
state phenomenally conscious? Murray, like many others,12 is sympathetic 
to what is called the HOT theory, which he describes as follows:
For a mental state to be a conscious state (phenomenally) requires an accompanying 
higher-order mental state (a HOT) that has that state as its intentional object. The 
HOT must be thought that one is, oneself, in that first-order state. Only humans 
have the cognitive faculties required to form the conception of themseves being in 
a first-order state that one must have in order to have a HOT.13
Thus, one can maintain that animals have a rich mental life, including 
having pain states, and recognize that these states can be accessed in the 
cognitive economy of individuals, playing a causal role in their behaviors, 
while at the same time holding that animals do not have the higher 
order mental states that would make them aware of the other mental 
states. So, they could actually be in pain, but since they don’t have the 
mental capacity to represent themselves as being in pain, their pain is 
phenomenally nonconscious. 
Of course HOT is not the only theory in town. There are those who 
argue for Higher Order Perception Theories (HOP).14 There is no consensus 
on which of these approaches is more plausible.15 Generally, HOP theories 
are more amenable to animal consciousness, but Murray holds that it is 
not reasonable to expect that nonhuman animals could have higher order 
states of any sort. There are, however, theories that restrict consciousness 
to first order states and other theories that identify consciousness with 
inner perceptual states. This is not the place to argue the theories out, 
but all other things being equal, inasmuch as a given theory requires me 
12 See especially Carruthers, Peter, Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Carruthers details this account with respect 
to animals in Carruthers, Peter, “Brute Experience,” The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (5), 
1989, 437-453. Other proponents of HOT theory include Dennett, Daniel, Conscious-
ness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown, 1991, and Rosenthal, David, “Two Concepts of 
Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies, 49 (3), 329-359.
13 Murray, op. cit., p. 55.
14 E.g., Armstrong, David, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, New York: Humanities 
Press, 1968, Churchland, Paul, “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain 
States, Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1), 1985, 8-28, and Lycan, William, Consciousness, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
15 See the discussion by Güzeldere, Güven, “Is Consciousness the Perception of What 
Passes in One’s Own Mind?”, in Block; Flanagan and Güzeldere (eds.), op. cit., 789-806.
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to abandon a deeply entrenched intuition about reality, I may have to 
give up my intuition, but I may also abandon the deeply counter-intuitive 
theory, due to its implausible implications. This is especially so, given that 
there are defensible theoretical alternatives.16 
It’s not obvious that HOT or similar theories really explain phenomenal 
consciousness. That is they don’t seem to explain what David Chalmers 
calls the “Hard Problem” of consciousness.17 HOT and HOP are getting 
at a kind of introspective consciousness to be sure, but it’s not clear 
exactly how a higher mental state brings about a state with a subjective 
feel. After all, one could have an artificially designed system with higher 
order states directed toward lower order states, as a sort of monitoring 
process of all the states of that system. While this system would be 
sophisticated indeed, it’s not obvious that there would be anything that 
it is like to be that system. If this is right, HOT theories do not explain 
the nature of consciousness at all.
Still, if a version of HOT theory is the only theory available, one can 
choose between a reading of HOT that allows attribution of conscious 
states to animal (why not attribute higher states to them?) or one could 
start with what is obviously true – many nonhuman animals have conscious 
states. If HOT implies they don’t, then I’ll reject HOT, even though I 
don’t yet have a suitable alternative. But why take it as obvious that 
animals are conscious? First there’s the behavioral evidence. The pain 
behaviors of many animals are similar to our own. In most cases, the pain 
behavior warrants the attribution of a conscious pain state in the human 
case, and should do so for animals as well. Secondly, at least for some 
animals, there are physiological similarities--anatomical similarities between 
humans and other animals, the fact that many animals have endogenous 
pain control systems, and the observation that analgesics and anesthetics 
work on many animals in just the way they work on human beings, all 
suggest that many animals actually feel their pains. It seems likely that 
the experience of conscious pain arose in our evolutionary history and 
conferred a distinctive advantage. Of course, none of this amounts to 
proof, as Murray or any Epiphenomenalist would quickly point out. 
It’s possible to have the physiological similarities, for evolution to work 
without Phenomenal Consciousness. But it does show that Neo-Cartesian 
16 For a concise overview of arguments for and against animal consciousness, see Al-
len, Colin and Bekoff, Marc, “Animal Consciousness”, in Velmans, Max and Schenedier, 
Susan (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, 58-71.
17 Chalmers, David, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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argument must be very strong indeed. Murray only needed to show that 
the Neo-Cartesian position is as plausible as not, given our acceptances. 
And in spite of his detailed account of recent work in cognitive ethology, 
and his attempts to deflect objections to the strategy, he has not done this.
If we accept the neo-Cartesian view of phenomenal consciousness, we 
must also accept that infants and severely mentally handicapped human 
beings do not feel pain, for they would not have the capacity to have 
the requisite higher order mental states to be phenomenally conscious. 
Perhaps, as Murray suggests, harming animals is morally objectionable 
on other grounds, but torturing animals, infants, or severely mentally 
defective human beings is not even possible. If infants can feel pain, HOT 
or similar theories are false. 
The skeptical argument of Neo-Cartesianism seems to run something like 
this; because it’s possible that certain creaturely actions can be accounted 
for without appealing to consciousness, it’s reasonable to conclude they 
didn’t (because of HOT, etc.) That type of reasoning doesn’t work 
generally, and it won’t work here. It may be possible that I don’t sweeten 
my coffee, but whether or not it’s reasonable to claim I don’t will depend 
on examining the actual evidence. Naturally, the evidence in the case of 
animal consciousness is difficult to come by. But given that no one has 
yet discovered a consciousness lobe or structure in the brain, we can also 
account for human behavior with Access Consciousness alone. That’s why 
it’s so easy to think of androids, robots, or zombies behaving just like us 
without any phenomenal states at all. Neo-Cartesian arguments that make 
animals into zombies can do the same for us. The problem of animal 
consciousness is a special case of the problem of other minds. It may seem 
possible to doubt the conscious states of other beings, but possibility does 
not entail “as plausible as not, given our justified acceptances.”
4. Do Zombies Have Moral Standing?
Before concluding the chapter on neo-Cartesianism, Murray attempts to 
account for the obvious ethical worries associated with seriously holding 
that animals are not phenomenally conscious of their pain states. Why not 
“torture” animals if they are not really feeling pain? Animals seem to lie 
outside the sphere of moral consideration, if the neo-Cartesian view is true. 
Murray discusses two approaches that would generate human obligations 
to animals. One is the Kantian approach. Kant argued that cruelty to 
animals is wrong because it is likely to lead to cruelty to human beings. 
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So, the obligation to be kind to animals is not really an obligation to 
them, but to other human beings. The only wrongness in tormenting an 
animal is that it is likely that I may do the same to a human being. What 
seems to be missing is a theory that shows that animals have inherent 
worth in themselves. But it’s hard, given the neo-Cartesian view, to see 
how they can have such moral worth, given that their cognitive modesty 
prevents them from being either proper moral agents or even subjects. 
So, Murray suggests a second distinctively Christian approach. 
The moral significance of animals may be, Murray asserts, that they 
are a part of the natural world, which has intrinsic worth because it is a 
divine creation. So, on this view it might be wrong to harm some animals 
in the way that it might be wrong to destroy a forest. The details about 
what actually is wrong would have to be worked out in an adequate 
theory. The difficulty here is that it’s easy to imagine the marginal cases 
of human beings in similar ways. If the neo-Cartesian view is correct, 
then severely retarded human beings cannot suffer. They can however 
still be within the sphere of moral consideration if we follow a Kantian 
suggestion that harming them might lead to harming non-retarded human 
beings, or if we say the wrongness of tormenting a severely retarded 
human is because they, like a tree, have intrinsic worth as a part of God’s 
creation. The problem in these cases, as with animals, is that we have 
good reason to think that the real reason it’s wrong to cause harm to 
animals or severely retarded humans is precisely that they do suffer. We 
do not discourage the torture of marginal human beings on the grounds 
that such torture may lead to the torture of nonmarginal human beings. 
Nor would we condemn this practice because marginal human beings, 
while nonsentient, have value by being a part of the created world.
Imagine similar arguments being put forward against the abuse of slaves 
in the American South in the mid nineteenth century. One could have 
argued that while the abused slaves do not actually feel their blows, it is 
nevertheless wrong to beat them so badly, for such behavior could lead to 
the abuse of fully conscious white slave owners and others. Furthermore, 
slaves are, after all, part of God’s creation, and marring God’s creation 
is just wrong. While this gets to the desired conclusion, i.e., it’s wrong 
to abuse slaves, it is still a bad argument to a good conclusion. The 
wrongness of the abuse and indeed the enslavement of these individual 
consists in the harm suffered directly by them. Similarly, Murray’s argument, 
which in effect says, “Don’t worry, denying consciousness to animals need 
have disastrous moral effects with respect to our treatment of animals,” 
provides moral considerability for animals but for the wrong reasons. 
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Indeed, the intuition that makes the moral result of Neo-Cartesianism seem 
disastrous in the first place is the very intuition that Neo-Cartesianism 
seeks to overcome – that many nonhuman animals do in fact suffer and 
that causing such suffering without a compelling reason is wrong.
5. Animals and Skepticism
There are other CDs or theodcies to bring to bear on the problem of 
God and animal pain. And Murray’s work on many them is both extensive 
and admirable. Here I just wanted to focus on the Neo-Cartesian approach 
that reduces animals to zombies. That approach, like that of Descartes, 
fails. Perhaps other approaches discussed by Murray or by Van Inwagen 
will shed light on the problem.18 But I doubt it. Ultimately, it seemed to 
me when I first wrote on animals and theodicy, and still does now, that 
the best theistic response, inasmuch as the theist wishes to maintain both 
the omnipotence and perfect goodness of God is to insist that there must 
in fact be a good reason why God permits the suffering of the fawn and 
other animals, even though human beings don’t know what that reason 
is. This can be called Skeptical Theism. It just doesn’t follow from the 
fact that we can’t see what greater good results from the suffering of 
the fawn that there is no greater good. The theist is confident, however, 
that there is. Naturally, the critic of theism will remain unconvinced. 
Even so, the skeptics who appeal to animal suffering will not undermine 
the defensibility of the classical theist’s position. And there’s the added 
advantage that because the theist isn’t getting into the whole business 
of explaining animal pain, she won’t risk minimizing the impact of the 
suffering of animals. Of course as I said earlier, the theist could also 
revise her or his account of God. If God is not omnipotent, the problem 
of evil takes on a rather different character. But given the assumption of 
divine omnipotence, and given the recognition of evil of suffering for the 
animals themselves, I can conclude that the best responses are versions of 
Skepticsm. If one has some reason to believe in God, given the problem 
of animal pain, Skeptical Theism appears to be a defensible position. If 
one does not have reasons for theistic belief, the problem of animal pain 
justifies Skepticism about theism.
18 van Inwagen, Peter, The Problem of Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
